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Causation, Legal History, and Legal Doctrine 
CHARLES BARZUN† 
INTRODUCTION 
To ask about the “opportunities for law’s intellectual 
history” is, to my mind, to ask about the relationship between 
two disciplines, law and history. True, that interpretation is 
not compulsory since the conference organizers have wisely 
not specified what such opportunities should be for. So 
perhaps the field of legal intellectual history could serve as a 
guinea pig for some new method of bibliographical 
classification to replace the Dewey Decimal System. That 
would be an “opportunity” of sorts. Presumably, though, the 
aim is to stimulate thought and debate about how law’s 
intellectual history may prove relevant to, and useful for 
thinking about, the kinds of questions with which scholars 
are currently concerned. And since the organizers and most 
of the participants in the conference are law professors, and 
since the conference itself took place in a law school and its 
proceedings are being published in a law review, I interpret 
the description of the conference to mean something like 
“opportunities for showing why the intellectual history of law 
is relevant to, or useful for, our thinking about law,” where 
“law” is understood to refer not only to legal doctrine, but also 
more broadly to “legal practice” or “legal thought” or “legal 
theory” or, perhaps, “the kinds of things law professors care 
about and talk about.”  
With this assumption about the purpose of the 
conference in mind, I offer this Paper as a friendly criticism 
of what I perceive to be a trend in legal history. The trend to 
which I refer is legal historians’ increasing reluctance to offer 
causal explanations of past events.1 Such reluctance is 
  
† Armistead M. Dobie Professor of Law, University of Virginia.  
 1. See John Henry Schlegel, Commentary, Philosophical Inquiry and 
Historical Practice, 101 VA. L. REV. 1197, 1198 (2015) (observing that historians 
“once had causes, but causation has fallen a bit out of style”); Christopher Tomlins 
& John Comaroff, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Practice in Legal History, 1 U.C. 
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understandable because the concept of “cause” is a 
notoriously elusive one. It is elusive both because the concept 
is used to refer to different kinds of relations between events 
or states of affairs and because, even if one is precise about 
which relation one means to pick out, it may be difficult to 
say with certainty of any two events or states of affairs that 
they in fact stand in such a relation to each other. One 
cannot, after all, see, feel, hear, or touch causes. Still, I worry 
that if legal historians give up any effort to offer causal 
explanations of legal rules, concepts, categories, theories, 
relations, distinctions, practices or understandings (let’s just 
call these “legal practices or understandings”), they threaten 
to undermine one of the chief ways in which they (properly, 
in my view) have traditionally understood intellectual 
history to be relevant to law, namely as the basis for critique 
of current practice. My aim is thus to show why histories that 
try to remain agnostic as to the driving causal forces in their 
accounts are either insufficiently critical, insufficiently 
historical, or both.  
Before doing so, however, let me add a little more flesh to 
my suggestion that legal historians are at risk of 
undermining their own ambitions. Consider an example 
drawn from a recent symposium on legal history, entitled 
“Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, which 
took place at U.C. Irvine in 2010.2 In their Foreword to the 
symposium issue, Catherine Fisk and Robert Gordon explain 
that a common feature of the papers presented there is that 
the question of whether law is “something mostly determined 
by external social change or itself a cause . . . that vexed so 
much of legal history for a generation has been dismissed, 
just as one might dismiss the debate over whether the 
chicken preceded the egg.”3 Efforts to “explain causation,” the 
  
IRVINE L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2011) (describing a form of historical practice they 
label “complex accumulation,” which is “postmodernist” and which “repudiates 
causal explanation” on the ground that “it eschews the idea that consensus can 
be established on a means of disciplining evidence”). 
 2. Symposium, “Law As . . .”: Theory and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. 
IRVINE L. REV. 519 (2011). 
 3. Catherine L. Fisk & Robert W. Gordon, Foreword: “Law As . . .”: Theory 
and Method in Legal History, 1 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 519, 525 (2011). I should 
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authors observe, are mostly absent from the papers.4 And yet, 
on the very same page, the authors remark that a “critical 
stance” seems to be “the unanimous theoretical commitment 
of these scholars.”5  
The question I mean to raise is this: how much critical 
bite can an historical account really have without making 
(inherently controversial) claims about which things caused 
which other things? The answer depends on how exactly 
history might be used to critique current legal practices or 
understandings. So let us take a look at a few such possible 
uses.  
I. IMPEACHING ARGUMENTS 
One very concrete form of historical critique is the use of 
history to undermine the precedential authority of a 
particular court decision by showing that the court that 
decided it was motivated by improper considerations, 
irrelevant to the issue at hand. I’ll refer to such an argument 
as an “impeaching argument” because it makes a claim about 
what it takes to “impeach” a court precedent or (put another 
way) to erode its legal authority.6 The claim is that when a 
court decides a case on the basis of such improper 
considerations, that fact undermines or impeaches its 
precedential status because it shows that the background 
assumption that justifies our practice of deferring to past 
court decisions as a general matter—namely, that past courts 
have applied the relevant legal principles in good faith—does 
not hold in a particular case. If historical evidence about the 
context in which the case was decided reveals that a 
particular court was motivated by something else entirely, 
then we no longer have good reason to treat its judgment as 
authoritative.  
  
perhaps note that Professor Gordon says in a footnote that his contribution to this 
Paper took the form of “a few editorial suggestions.” Id. at 519 n.**.  
 4. Id. at 525. 
 5. Id. 
 6. I discuss this kind of argument at greater length in Charles L. Barzun, 
Impeaching Precedent, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1625 (2013). 
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Of course, any actual impeaching argument must make 
a controversial judgment about what such “proper 
considerations” include and exclude. Do they include, for 
instance, the social, political, or economic consequences of the 
decision? But right now we are concerned only with the kind 
of reasoning that impeaching arguments involve, and that 
reasoning is sound as long as there exist some factors that 
are properly relevant to a court’s decision, and others that 
are not.7  
An example may help illustrate the point. In the 1996 
case of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Supreme 
Court considered whether the Eleventh Amendment 
prohibited Congress from authorizing federal courts to hear 
suits brought against a state by one of its own citizens.8 In 
holding that the Amendment did bar Congress from 
abrogating state sovereign immunity in this way, the Court 
placed considerable weight on its 1890 decision, Hans v. 
Louisiana, which had offered an expansive interpretation of 
the Eleventh Amendment.9 In dissent, Justice Souter argued, 
with two other justices joining him, that Hans should not be 
given precedential weight because the Hans Court only gave 
the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment it did because 
it feared it could not enforce its judgments in the post-
Reconstruction South.10 Citing the work of historians, Justice 
Souter described the political circumstances in which Hans 
arose and concluded that “history explains, but does not 
honor, Hans.”11 
This kind of historical argument is controversial. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist denounced Souter’s explanation of Hans 
on the ground that it did a “disservice to the Court’s 
traditional method of adjudication.”12 But it is controversial 
  
 7. For instance, I suspect most would agree that it would be improper for a 
judge to decide a case a certain way because she would profit financially from 
doing so.  
 8. 517 U.S. 44, 53 (1996). 
 9. Id. at 54, 64, 76 (relying on approach taken in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 
1 (1890)). 
 10. Id. at 100, 118-23 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 11. Id. at 122. 
 12. Id. at 68-69 (majority opinion). 
2016] LEGAL DOCTRINE 85 
 
precisely because it is perceived to be a threat to the 
legitimacy of its target. In other words, such an historical 
argument appears to be an effective critique of a legal 
authority or set of authorities.  
Still, the logic of impeaching arguments depends on the 
assumption that it is possible to discover why courts have 
decided cases the way they did. That is, developing such an 
argument requires making claims about what best explains 
a given court decision. It is only because the historical 
evidence suggests that what really caused the Hans Court to 
decide the case the way it did was its concern for the Court’s 
institutional power (not because it thought its reading of the 
Eleventh Amendment was the best one) that we can draw the 
inference that its precedential authority has been impeached. 
So an historical account is powerless to level this kind of 
critique unless it is willing to take sides, in this particular 
case, on the question of whether it was the Court’s 
application of the legal principles themselves, or instead 
various social or political factors, that determined the 
outcome.13  
II. GENEALOGIES 
Now it might be objected that when legal historians talk 
of “critical” history, they do not have this kind of critique in 
mind. In his classic article Critical Legal Histories, Professor 
Robert Gordon argued that even historical approaches that 
emphasize the causal importance of factors outside legal 
materials in explaining legal phenomena—whether those 
factors are social, political, or economic—are in some ways 
still in the grip of what he called the “evolutionary-
functionalist” view of American legal history.14 That is 
because they still wrongly assume that one can identify social 
“needs” or “interests” independent of the legal structures that 
in part constitute those interests.15 Thus, under this view, 
truly critical history is deeper and broader than the 
  
 13. Cf. Fisk & Gordon, supra note 3, at 525.  
 14. See Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 67-68 
(1984). 
 15. Id. at 102-04.  
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impeaching argument described above because it shows the 
way in which our most basic legal categories and distinctions 
(e.g. that between “public” and “private” realms) are both the 
product of, and themselves give rise to, political and 
ideological struggles among different groups.16 
But we are still left with the same question: wherein lies 
the critical bite? By what line of reasoning does the historical 
account offered undermine or challenge the status quo? 
Maybe the critique lies in revealing how many of the concepts 
we commonly employ in our everyday lives and whose 
meanings sometimes seem obvious and uncontroversial—
terms like “husband,” “wife,” “owner,” or “tenant”—are in fact 
legal terms of art whose implications are politically 
contestable—and are actually contested.17 Perhaps so, but 
there is nothing distinctively historical about this kind of 
critique. Presumably, the legal historian wants to argue that 
the past or origins of today’s legal practices and 
understandings are in some way relevant to how we should 
think about them today. But how, exactly? 
The most common answer is that historical accounts 
expose the contingency of the unexamined assumptions of 
legal practice. Once one sees how particular events and 
circumstances led to today’s practices and understandings, 
which to us seem so utterly normal and natural, we see that 
in fact they were far from inevitable.18 The point of such 
accounts is thus to show that things could have been 
otherwise.19  
  
 16. See id. at 99, 101.  
 17. See id. at 103 (observing that “among the first words one might use to 
identify the various people in an office would likely be words connoting legal 
status: ‘That’s the owner over there.’”). 
 18. See id. at 71 (criticizing the tendency of evolutionary functionalist 
historical accounts to “start explaining the whole contingent miscellany of 
contemporary social practices (especially the nasty ones) as the natural outcome 
of the ‘modernization process’”).  
 19. See Jessica K. Lowe, Radicalism’s Legacy: American Legal History Since 
1998 (Univ. Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory, Research Paper No. 2014-64, Nov. 
2014) (endorsing the view “that contingency, is one of the major gifts that history 
has to offer law: the reminder that things don’t have to look the way they do, that 
there have been many options, many possibilities”). 
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Here it is worth distinguishing between two implications 
that the revelation of such historical contingency might 
carry. The first, weaker implication is just that human 
choices—not large, impersonal historical forces—determine 
the course of history. This alone is sufficient to counter a 
strong claim of historical determinism because it asserts that 
present understandings were not literally inevitable.20 And 
for just that reason, it does entail making a causal judgment. 
Specifically, it asserts that human will or choice plays a 
causal role in history21—hardly a vacuous claim since the 
existence of genuine human agency is strongly contested in 
some quarters. But this implication of contingency is still 
weak in the sense that it does not alone give any reason to 
doubt the value, or question the legitimacy, of the 
contemporary practice in question. The defender of the 
practice may always respond to such demonstrations of the 
contingency of its current shape by saying, in effect, 
“So what?”  
For that reason, critical historians often hope that 
demonstrating contingency will carry a stronger implication. 
They want to say of some contemporary practice or 
understanding not just that it was not necessary that it took 
the shape it did but that we have reason to consider it suspect 
or illegitimate in some way. And such an inference is only 
warranted if the best defense of the practice depends on it 
having been developed for good reasons. In other words, the 
critique’s target must be the view that we should trust the 
historical processes that led to some practice—perhaps 
because they were democratically legitimate, or that they 
involved free and open debate, or that they were the products 
of good-faith experimentation and trial-and-error, or that 
  
 20. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 70 (criticizing evolutionary functionalist 
history on the ground that its “working assumptions misleadingly objectify 
history, making highly contingent developments appear to have been necessary”). 
 21. See, e.g., Risa Lauren Goluboff, “Let Economic Equality Take Care of Itself”: 
The NAACP, Labor Litigation, and the Making of Civil Rights in the 1940s, 52 
UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1486 (2005) (“The civil rights doctrine we have today, the 
doctrine born in education cases and grown into an anticlassification rule, was 
not inevitable. It was chosen.”).  
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they reflected the wisdom of those who understood what is 
True and Right.  
Thus, for instance, the critic may argue that our private-
law doctrines did not develop out of man’s increasing 
awareness of the value of individual autonomy; instead, they 
were the product of a political and ideological struggle in 
which some participants had more wealth, power, and 
knowledge than did others.22 The point of such accounts is to 
show that the historical factors that actually led to our 
current practice are much more sinister—or, at the very 
least, less well-reasoned—than we had thought. We are thus 
less justified in placing our trust in their legitimacy or value 
than we were prior to learning the historical account. We 
might call this kind of argument a genealogical argument.23 
As I hope can be seen, the logical structure of 
genealogical arguments is essentially the same as that of the 
impeaching arguments, discussed above. In both cases, the 
argument challenges an implicit background assumption 
that the process by which some practice or understanding 
was produced was a reliable or healthy one.24 It purports to 
show why, instead, that process was corrupted or for some 
reason untrustworthy. More important, in both cases, the 
force of the argument depends critically on a causal 
explanation as to why some event or state of affairs—a 
Supreme Court decision in the one case, the widespread 
acceptance of some practice or understanding—came to be. 
  
 22. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–
1860 (1977); Gordon, supra note 14, at 101 (“Legal forms and practices are 
political products that arise from the struggles of conflicting social groups that 
possess very disparate resources of wealth, power, status, knowledge, access to 
armed force, and organizational capability.”). 
 23. For the most famous example of such an argument—indeed, the one that 
probably gave “genealogy” its current, critical connotation—see Friedrich 
Nietszche, 10 THE WORKS OF FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE: A GENEALOGY OF MORALS 35 
(Alexander Tille ed., William A. Hausemann trans., 1897) (arguing that the 
dominant Judeo-Christian morality of Nietzsche’s day was the product of a “slave-
revolt in morality” fueled by the resentment which the weak felt toward the 
powerful). 
 24. Needless to say, such arguments also depend on some normative judgment 
about what makes an historical process reliable or healthy.  
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And that is true even of those critical legal historical 
accounts that purport to show the way in which the 
ideological struggles mentioned above have both caused and 
been constrained by legal practices and understandings.25 
Without that causal explanation as to why our social visions 
have been limited, redirected, or warped, the critique loses 
all force. Hence, even if the “critical stance” endorsed by 
many legal historians refers to this deeper or broader form of 
critique, it still requires the historian to make claims about 
which ideas, institutions, individuals or groups are most 
causally responsible for making the historical phenomena 
under examination what it is today.  
But of course, not all historical accounts, not even all 
critical ones, mean to offer genealogical arguments. So one 
might object that I still have too narrow a view of what form 
critical historical accounts might take. So let us look at two 
other possibilities. 
III. STORIES 
The first of these possibilities is that writing history is 
just about offering a new or different narrative. Go to a legal-
history workshop these days, and you will hear lots of talk of 
stories: “People typically say that X is all about Y, but in the 
story I’m telling, Z looms large”; “As I see it, your story is 
about A, B and C, whereas in Joe’s story, D, E, and F are 
salient.” Some of the early critical legal histories were quite 
explicit in targeting a specific story about modern Western 
history, which they saw as dominant. In Professor Gordon’s 
words, this was a narrative of the “gradual recession of error 
before the advance of commerce, liberty, and science—an 
advance modestly but invaluably assisted by ever more 
efficiently adaptive technologies of law.”26 According to 
  
 25. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 14, at 70 n.35 (observing, in discussing 
postwar attitudes about labor-capital relations, that “[c]ritical historians treat 
th[e] more or less unexamined background assumption of a relationship of social 
necessity (efficient production requires legal forms preserving managerial 
prerogatives) as an ideological practice that helped to produce social necessity 
because it suppressed alternative methods of governing production as 
unthinkable or unrealistic”) (emphasis omitted). 
 26. Id. at 96.  
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Professor Gordon, critical historians offered competing, more 
pessimistic stories, such as Professor Horwitz’s account of 
nineteenth-century private law, in which the “dark side of 
capitalist development” was made more visible and brought 
to light.27 
There is nothing wrong with stories, and it may be that 
(as the word itself suggests) without some kind of narrative 
structure, history ceases to be history. But even if so, we must 
again ask, in what way might a story offer a critique? We 
have already considered one possibility: genealogies are 
certainly one kind of story—about how wicked, dumb, or 
arbitrary forces (whether ideas or people or something else) 
produced some seemingly “natural” state of affairs. But as 
we’ve seen, such stories very much depend on offering causal 
explanations. Are there stories that do not do so and yet still 
offer potent critiques of current practices or understandings? 
One way these stories might do so is by showing that the 
relevant cast of characters is other than what people have 
assumed. The emergence of civil rights law in the mid-
twentieth century, for instance, is not really about nine 
Justices divining rights embedded in the Constitution (or 
even about those same Justices advancing a liberal-
progressive political agenda). It is instead about the many 
civil-rights lawyers, working for the NAACP and other 
organizations, who decided which cases to bring and which 
ones not to bring.28 If true, this story suggests that today we 
may be too focused on the Supreme Court as the primary 
source of constitutional law when in fact it is the lawyers 
working “on the ground” who generate many of the legal 
ideas that eventually get instantiated as part of 
constitutional doctrine. In this way, a particular narrative 
about the development of civil-rights law serves as a kind of 
critique of current attitudes, though not exactly a 
genealogical one.  
That is true, but as this example illustrates, what sense 
can be given to the phrases “the story is about . . .” or the 
“relevant cast of characters” other than causal ones? If the 
Supreme Court had a sufficiently clear and specific vision of 
  
 27. Id. at 96-97. 
 28. See, e.g., Goluboff, supra note 21.  
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exactly which rights required constitutional protection, 
perhaps it did not matter which cases were brought before 
the Court because they would have found a way to issue the 
rules they envisioned, regardless. Whether this bit of 
historical speculation is right, or even plausible, is not the 
point. Rather, the point is that if the above historical 
narrative described is not flatly inconsistent with it, then its 
critical edge is considerably dulled: the workings of lawyers 
would be shown to have been relatively inconsequential in 
how things turned out, so why should we think things are 
different now? And yet if the narrative does entail that the 
speculation is false, then that means it is making a causal 
argument about what mattered to the outcome. 
Another way an historical narrative might be used to 
criticize existing legal practices or understandings is by 
showing that while those practices might have served a 
useful function once, they no longer do so today because 
circumstances have changed. Although at one point, for 
instance, the most important threats to free speech may have 
appeared to come from governmental suppression of political 
speech, these days the more serious threat comes from 
corporate control over the media, which has the power to shut 
out other voices entirely. Thus, because a still-dominant 
theory of free speech, which grounds its protection on its 
value for democracy, was developed with this older concern 
in mind and is less effective at guarding against the current 
threat, it should now be abandoned in favor of an autonomy-
based theory.29 
The first thing to note about this argument is that it is 
not really critical in the way that critical legal historians 
originally aimed to be. Indeed, arguments of this sort seem to 
  
 29. See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS 
LEGACY OF CIVIL LIBERTARIANISM (1991). I’ve altered Professor Graber’s argument 
slightly to make it a better candidate for this kind of argument. In reality, his 
argument is more of a genealogical one since he suggests that the main reason 
why progressive legal theorists developed the democratic theory of free speech 
was that they were loathe (for political reasons) to base its defense on an 
individual-rights theory that smacked of the Lochner doctrine they had spent 
such energy criticizing. See Charles L. Barzun, Politics or Principle? Zechariah 
Chafee and the Social Interest in Free Speech, 2007 BYU L. REV. 259, 269-71 
(summarizing Graber’s argument).   
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assume precisely the view that Professor Gordon attacked as 
“evolutionary functionalism,” namely the view that legal 
rules developed in response to social needs.30 No surprise, 
then, that, as already noted, it is a form of historical 
argument that courts standardly employ when overturning 
their own precedent.31 But the more important point is that 
this kind of argument still requires offering causal 
explanations—albeit of a teleological sort.32 The democratic 
theory of free speech only developed when it did and in the 
way that it did because courts, policymakers, or citizens (for 
our purposes here, it does not matter which) had a particular 
understanding of what the most dire threats to free speech 
were and shaped the law in line with that understanding.  
No doubt there are many other kinds of historical 
narratives as well, but the examples above are sufficient to 
illustrate the general point that any such narrative must 
make causal claims—even if only implicit ones—about which 
actions produced which consequences. Consider the following 
story: “One day, Jane went to school. During recess, John bit 
Jane. Jane cried. The teacher asked John to apologize, which 
he did. John and Jane then became friends.” Even this simple 
story makes a number of implicit causal claims—that Jane 
cried because she was in pain from John’s bite; that the 
teacher asked John to apologize because he bit Jane; that 
John apologized because the teacher asked him to; and that 
the two children are friends because of John’s apology. The 
lesson is obvious but important. Without making causal 
judgments about what connects discrete events, history 
would literally be “one damned thing after another” without 
any coherent narrative at all.  
At this point, one may accuse me of attacking a straw 
man. No one holds so extreme a view as to insist that an 
historian should never make any causal judgments of even 
the basic, commonsensical sort just described. I’ll take up this 
  
 30. Gordon, supra note 14, at 63.  
 31. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20-22 (1997) (justifying its 
decision to overrule a past decision on the basis of the Court’s interest “in 
recognizing and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of 
accumulated experience”). 
 32. Some deny that teleological arguments are causal arguments at all, but I 
put that issue aside here.  
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objection directly below, but it may help diffuse the force of 
the straw-man allegation somewhat by first considering 
another kind of history that does not necessarily require 
making causal claims. 
IV. RESTORATIVE PROJECTS 
The kind of history I have in mind is one that looks to the 
past as a source of ideals and inspirations. Such histories 
may look to some prior era to show that a particular set of 
ideas, now forgotten, were expressed and taken seriously by 
society generally, or some subset of it, with the hope that 
casting such a light might encourage those today to take 
those ideas seriously as well.33 Such histories are often 
coupled with a genealogical story that purports to explain 
why, despite its intrinsic appeal, the ideas or understandings 
were nevertheless repressed, obscured, or lost.34 But they 
need not be so coupled, and if they are not, such an account 
does not depend, for its critical force, on any particular set of 
causal inferences. Instead, the point of such an account is just 
to say, “here is one way of doing things or thinking about 
things that some people once highly regarded and perhaps 
should be so regarded again (in place of our current 
understandings).”  
Again, there is nothing wrong with this kind of history 
(and some of my own work may be best described in this way), 
but a couple features of it warrant mention. The first is that 
it is a far cry from the kind of history that the earlier 
generation of critical historians sought to offer. Indeed, it is 
probably most associated in the legal academy these days 
with constitutional originalism, which itself is seen by many 
as a conservative, even retrograde, intellectual movement.35 
  
 33. Professor Graber’s history of free speech theory is, in part (but only in part), 
a restorative project of what he calls the “conservative libertarian tradition” of 
free speech. See GRABER, supra note 29, at 17-50.  
 34. For example, Professor Graber argues that the conservative libertarian 
tradition of free speech was consciously buried by political progressives who 
feared that its association with Lochner-style economic rights would jeopardize 
the progressive political agenda. See id. at 12. 
 35. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING 
COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA, at xiii (2005) (characterizing originalism as 
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True, this kind of history need not, and is not always, 
motivated by political conservatism,36 but it is a quite 
traditional form of history—one that might be better 
characterized as an alternative (or even antidote) to critical 
history, rather than an embodiment of it. 
The more important point is that there is nothing 
inherently historical about this use of history—or nothing 
that makes an idea’s existence in the past of special relevance 
to its value today. As described above, it involves merely 
presenting an alternative picture of how things could be. Or 
perhaps I should be more precise: there is nothing inherently 
historical about this use of history unless one ascribes to 
those who expressed or endorsed the understandings or 
practices described a special kind of authority—as defenders 
of originalism do, for instance, to those who drafted or ratified 
the Constitution. But not only is such deference to the 
authority of past actors anathema to most modern historians, 
it would again depend on implicit (causal) judgments about 
the true motivations of those actors who endorsed the vision. 
After all, if those motivations turned out to be themselves 
crassly political, economic, or ideological, deference to their 
views would be vulnerable to the impeaching or genealogical 
arguments described above.37 
  
constitutional “fundamentalism,” comparing it to religious fundamentalism, and 
observing that some fundamentalists seem to “approach the Constitution as if it 
were inspired directly by God”).  
 36. The so-called “republican revival” may be an example of a left-leaning 
restorative project. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 
1493, 1494 (1988) (endorsing and defending the “civic-republican strain in 
political thought that has been identified, traced, and analyzed in much recent 
writing on history, social and political theory, and American constitutionalism”). 
For one of the original historical works that inspired this revival, see BERNARD 
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).  
 37. See, e.g., Michael Klarman, The Constitution as a Coup Against Public 
Opinion (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that “[t]he 
compromises undertaken in Philadelphia also illustrate the extent to which the 
Constitution was a product of clashing interests—not dispassionate political 
philosophizing”).  
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V. LEGAL HISTORY AND LAW 
It is now time to take up directly the objection suggested 
above that I am attacking a straw man. For it may be that 
what legal historians resist is not so much making causal 
arguments about why certain historical actors took the 
actions they did, or what consequences those actions 
produced; rather, what they resist is making general claims 
about what the causal forces in history are in the way that 
various social sciences sometimes aspire to do.38 Hence, the 
authors of the Foreword quoted above acknowledge that it “is 
important to explain that somebody did something to, with, 
or for someone else, for identifiable reasons and with 
identifiable consequences.”39 What they nevertheless 
maintain is that “[l]egal history is not trying to be an 
empirical social science aiming to identify a series of 
variables and use the past as an experiment to prove that one 
or two variables produced particular effects.”40 Under this 
view, what legal historians refuse is not the demand to offer 
causal explanations as such but rather the demand that they 
adopt a particular theory of causal explanation according to 
which to explain something is to show that it was dictated by 
general laws.41 
If that is the concern, then it is a well justified one, and I 
take the objection to be decisive. For it seems to me that just 
this difference—between, on the one hand, looking to the 
historical context of a particular decision in order to explain 
why it came out the way it did and, on the other, explaining 
it by reference to some kind of background generalization—
does seem to mark at least one (if not the) important 
  
 38. See Gordon, supra note 14, at 75 (describing the hope that “we will be able 
to generalize convincingly and fairly abstractly about what social conditions will 
produce what legal responses and what effects upon society those responses will 
have in their turn,” but then observing that “it’s fair to say that on the whole such 
statements of regularity in legal-social relations don’t stand up very well to 
historical criticism”).  
 39. Fisk & Gordon, supra note 3, at 525.  
 40. Id. 
 41. The locus classicus here is Carl G. Hempel, The Function of General Laws 
in History, 39 J. PHIL. 35, 37 (1942) (“A set of events can be said to have caused 
the event to be explained only if general laws can be indicated which connect 
‘causes’ and ‘effect’ . . . .”). 
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difference between the assumptions and methods of history 
and those of the empirical social sciences. Thus, in my view, 
legal historians, like all historians, do well to resist the 
assumption that there are deterministic forces at work—
whether of a social, economic, evolutionary, or 
neurobiological sort—that leave no room whatsoever for 
genuine human agency to play a role in how history proceeds. 
And that is true even if, as suggested above, the prevailing 
view among scholars in some other academic disciplines is 
that such an assumption is false. 
But in closing, let me offer two observations about where 
this leaves us. The first is just to emphasize the importance 
of keeping distinct the two kinds of concerns about causation 
distinguished above. Historians frequently talk of the 
importance of “context” in understanding the past, and they 
sometimes describe their work as offering “thick 
descriptions.”42 And for the reasons just stated, such focus on 
the particulars of the historical case seem to me well founded. 
But one point of this Paper has been to call attention to the 
fact that it is not at all obvious how learning the “context” of 
some set of legal understandings or practices bears on how 
we should evaluate it.43 There are indeed ways it might bear 
on such an evaluation, and I have discussed a few of them in 
an effort to highlight some of the assumptions on which they 
depend. But merely describing the social, economic, or 
political environment within which a practice arose is not 
enough on its own to make a persuasive critique (or 
endorsement) of it. Any further critical judgment depends on 
  
 42. See, e.g., Fisk & Gordon, supra note 3, at 524 (“Whatever the terminology, 
perhaps the most common and most significant methodological and theoretical 
insight of these works, and the enduring insight of the ‘law and’ framework, is the 
importance of context in the study of law.”) (emphasis omitted); Lowe, supra note 
19 (“[I]f history offers contingency to law, it also offers concreteness, contexts for 
texts and arguments, as well as the concerns of those who made them.”); see also 
Gordon, supra note 14, at 125 (suggesting that one of the aims of critical history 
is to offer “thickly described accounts of how law has been imbricated in and has 
helped to structure the most routine practices of social life”).  
 43. Cf. Nicola Lacey, Jurisprudence, History, and the Institutional Quality of 
Law, 101 VA. L. REV. 919, 925 (2015) (stressing the importance of context for 
understanding jurisprudential theories, but acknowledging that we may 
“struggle to articulate the distinctively jurisprudential significance” of the 
influence of H. L. A. Hart’s political and cultural context on his thought).  
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inherently controversial judgments about what made (or 
didn’t make)44 a causal difference to how things went in a 
given context.45 So while historians are obviously free (and 
should be encouraged) to offer thick descriptions of some 
time-and-place for the sake of broadening our experience of 
the world, if they want to offer effective critiques of a set of 
legal practices and understandings, they must go beyond 
description and offer explanations—or, at the very least (to 
use Geertz’s own preferred term) “diagnoses”—of those 
practices and understandings.46 
The second point is more about law than history. Legal 
historians often criticize the use of history by lawyers, judges, 
and legal scholars as “law-office history.”47 Sometimes that 
term is just used to describe shoddy research, anachronistic 
reasoning, or strategic cherry-picking from historical 
materials.48 So understood, the label is no doubt sometimes 
fairly applied, but it amounts to little more than a charge of 
poor historical scholarship—one that could be leveled against 
some historians as well. Other times, though, the suggestion 
seems to be something deeper—that when courts invoke 
history, they are engaged in a fundamentally different sort of 
inquiry—one that is about rationalizing the past, rather than 
discovering the truth about it. Hence, the organizers of this 
conference suggest in their preparatory materials that legal 
doctrine may not be a topic of interest to “historians of the 
  
 44. The critical force in historians’ efforts to expose the inherent contradictions 
in some area of legal doctrine lies in the suggestion that such contradictions prove 
that application of the relevant legal sources did not causally determine how 
courts resolved cases in that area. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of 
Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205 (1979); see also Gordon, supra 
note 14, at 115 (“The common thread of these histories is the observation that the 
contradiction makes available for the decision of every case matched pairs of 
arguments that are perfectly plausible within the logic of the system but that cut 
in exactly opposite directions.”). 
 45. And again, it also depends on a normative judgment about what a proper, 
reliable, or healthy kind of historical development would look like.  
 46. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of 
Culture, in THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3, 27 (2000 ed. 2000). 
 47. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy 
Relationship, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 165 (2006). 
 48. See id. 
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sort who rightly eschew lawyers’ history as not history at 
all.”49 
Ironically, the same view is endorsed by lawyers who 
hope to shield law from historical forms of criticism. One can 
see it in the Chief Justice’s suggestion that Justice Souter’s 
explanation of the Court’s decision in Hans v. Louisiana did 
a “disservice to the Court’s traditional method of 
adjudication.”50 And three decades ago, Ronald Dworkin 
responded to the genealogical arguments of critical legal 
historians by suggesting that they offered arguments of the 
wrong sort; they offered only “genetic[ ]” arguments, whereas 
what was required were “interpretive” arguments that aimed 
to put past legal materials in the best light.51  
Now I think this view of law and legal reasoning is 
mistaken. There is, it seems to me, a deep and important 
affinity between legal and historical forms of reasoning and 
argument. Explanatory narratives and restoration projects of 
the sort described above already play roles in courtroom 
rhetoric and lawyerly argument, whether at trial or in 
appellate opinions. And impeaching and genealogical 
arguments, though less common in actual court practice, 
share with traditional legal reasoning the assumption that 
certain historical figures or historical processes, for one 
reason or another, purport to be authoritative. Finally, there 
is a long tradition in the common law of privileging concrete 
and particular judgments over abstract and general ones. For 
these reasons, critical legal history has the potential to 
influence legal practices and understandings and even to 
constitute what legal doctrine is. 
But this is not the place to defend that large claim. The 
point here is simply to suggest that when historians treat 
lawyers’ use of history as not really history at all, they are 
playing into the hands of those who would dismiss historical 
arguments as irrelevant to the concerns of courts and 
lawyers. That is, when historians accept the view (to 
  
 49. E-mail from John Henry Schlegel, Professor and Floyd H. and Hilda L. 
Hurst Faculty Scholar, SUNY Buffalo Law School, to author (Nov. 3, 2013, 
8:52 PM) (on file with author).  
 50. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 68-69 (1996). 
 51. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 273 (1986). 
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summarize crudely) that historians explain while lawyers 
rationalize, they contribute to the diminishing significance of 
history to judicial decision-making. And that diminishment 
approaches a vanishing point when historians no longer even 
see themselves as actually explaining how we got to where 
we are.  
 
